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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of international trade in a general equilibrium model 
in which heterogeneous firms engage in oligopolistic competition.  An increase of the size 
of the market leads to a decrease of the equilibrium price and an increase of per capita 
consumption.  The opening of international trade leads to an increased degree of 
competition, a lower price level, and the exit of least efficient firms.  Though average profit 
increases, not all the surviving firms benefit from the opening of international trade. 
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1. Introduction 
 For convenience, it is frequently assumed that firms are homogeneous in terms of 
their production technologies.  In reality, firms may employ different technologies with 
different productivities over long periods of time.  For example, in their study of how the 
West grew rich, Rosenberg and Birdzell [1986] show that water power continued to be 
used long after the introduction of the steam engine (p. 154) and the power loom and 
handloom coexisted for more than fifty years before the handloom finally disappeared (p. 
160).  For international difference in technologies, Chandler [1990, Chapter 7] shows that 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, technologies used by British firms in many 
capital-intensive industries were systematically less efficient than technologies used by 
counterpart firms in the United States. 
Modern production is associated with the extensive use of machines.  Machines are 
fixed costs of production.  With the existence of significant fixed costs of production, a 
firm with a higher level of output has a cost advantage over a firm with a lower level of 
output and an industry may be monopolized.  However, many countries have anti-trust 
laws that can be used to prevent monopoly from happening.  As a result, many industries 
are characterized by oligopolistic competition [Chandler, 1990].  The significance of 
                                                 
1 I thank Gilbert L. Skillman for his extremely detailed and insightful suggestions.  I also thank an anonymous 
referee for valuable suggestions.  The usual disclaimer applies. 
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oligopolistic competition is recognized in standard textbooks on industrial organization; 
for example Pindyck and Rubinfeld [2005, p. 441] write “oligopoly is a prevalent form of 
market structure. Examples of oligopolistic industries include automobiles, steel, 
aluminum, petrochemicals, electrical equipment, and computers.”  The relevance of 
oligopolistic competition to international trade is even greater as firms engaging in 
international trade on average are larger than firms that do not engage in trade [Bleaney 
and Wakelin, 2002, p. 3].  Thus, firms engaging in international trade are likely to have 
market power and engage in oligopolistic competition. 
The opening of international trade may intensify the degree of competition and lead 
to the exit of less efficient firms and an increase in average productivity.  Empirical studies 
have shown that the exit of less efficient firms is an important source of the gains from 
trade.2  To address the exit of less efficient firms, models based on heterogeneous firms are 
needed.  With heterogeneous firms, the market structure can be either monopolistic 
competition or oligopolistic competition.  With monopolistic competition and a constant 
elasticity of demand, a firm’s price is affected only by the marginal cost and the elasticity 
of demand and does not change with the size of the market [Neary, 2001, 2003].  As there 
is only one firm producing each product, the opening of international trade does not change 
the degree of competition.  Thus a potential channel of the impact of the opening of trade 
through an increase in the degree of competition is excluded. 
This paper contributes to the literature by studying the impact of international trade 
in a general equilibrium model in which heterogeneous firms engage in oligopolistic 
competition.  In this model, to learn its marginal cost of production, a firm must first incur 
a fixed sampling cost.3  After learning its marginal cost, a firm chooses output optimally to 
maximize its profit.  A firm’s price as a markup over marginal cost of production decreases 
with the size of the market.  Even with a general utility function, this oligopolistic 
competition framework is very tractable and comparative static results are available.  In a 
closed economy, we show that an increase in the size of the market leads to a decrease in 
the equilibrium price and an increase in per capita consumption. 
                                                 
2 For example, Gu et al. [2003] show that the exit of less efficient firms is an important source of productivity 
gain for Canadian firms in their study of the impact of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. 
3 This is similar to the approach of McAfee and McMillan [1987], in which a bidder must pay a fixed fee in 
order to learn her true valuation of the item to be sold. 
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The opening of international trade leads to the exit of less efficient firms and not 
all the surviving firms benefit from the opening of trade.  These results are similar to those 
under monopolistic competition.  However, the mechanisms under different types of 
competition are different.  Under monopolistic competition, as the opening of trade 
increases the number of varieties produced by firms with lower marginal costs, firms with 
higher marginal costs can not cover their fixed costs and they exit.  Under oligopolistic 
competition, as the opening of trade decreases the price level, this leads to the exit of less 
efficient firms.  
In the literature, Lahiri and Ono [1988] studied the impact of international trade 
with intra-country firm heterogeneity in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition.  
Montagna [1995] and Melitz [2003] addressed the impact of international trade in models 
featuring heterogeneous firms engage in monopolistic competition.  Lahiri and Ono [2004] 
considered various types of analysis in asymmetric oligopoly models.  Qiu and Zhou [2007] 
examined incentives for firms to merge when they engage in oligopolisitic competition.  
They show that firm heterogeneity is a necessary condition for mergers to occur. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets up the model.  Section 
3 studies the equilibrium in a closed economy.  Section 4 establishes the existence of a 
unique equilibrium in an open economy.  Section 5 addresses the impact of the opening of 
international trade.  Section 6 discusses some extensions and generalizations of the model 
and concludes. 
 
2. The model 
In this section, we set up the model.  First, we study a consumer’s utility 
maximization problem.  Second, we study a firm’s decision process.  Third, we study the 
determination of the cutoff level of marginal cost in equilibrium.  Finally, the implications 
of free entry and exit are explored. 
First, consider the utility maximization problem of a representative consumer.  The 
number of consumers in a country is exogenously given and is denoted by L .  There is a 
continuum of products on the interval ]1,0[ , indexed by  .  All the goods are assumed to 
enter into a consumer’s utility function symmetrically.  Let )(c  denote a consumer’s 
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consumption of product  .  A consumer’s utility is then given by  dcU ))((
1
0 .  It is 
assumed that 0'U  and 0'' U .  Labor is the only factor of production.  Each consumer 
supplies one unit of labor inelastically.  The wage rate is w  and it is normalized to one in 
this paper: 1w .  The price level of product   is )(p .  This consumer’s budget 
constraint requires total spending on all products equals wage income: 
(1)    wdcp   )()(
1
0
.              
 A consumer takes the wage rate and prices of goods as given and chooses quantities 
of consumption to maximize utility.  Let   denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated 
with a consumer’s utility maximization.  A consumer’s utility maximization leads to 
pU ' .  A consumer’s elasticity of demand is defined as 
)(''
)(')(
ccU
cUc  , a positive 
number. 
Second, we study a firm’s profit maximization.  Each product is produced by 
multiple firms.  Similar to Neary [2003a, 2003b] and Zhou [2004, 2007a, 2007b], firms 
producing the same product are assumed to engage in Cournot competition.  Firms 
producing positive levels of output have the same level of fixed costs of production f .  
However, they may differ in their marginal costs of production. 4   A firm’s constant 
marginal cost   is distributed on a closed interval ],[  .5  The cumulative distribution 
function of   is )(G  and its corresponding density function is )(g .  For simplicity, it 
is assumed that )(g  is continuous.  To learn its marginal cost of production, a firm must 
first incur a fixed sampling cost 0ef .6  After learning its marginal cost, a firm decides 
whether to exit or begin to produce.  As a firm’s expected profit decreases with its marginal 
cost, a firm with a marginal cost higher than a cutoff level is not able to recover its fixed 
                                                 
4 One source of fixed cost is the amount of time spent on learning.  A higher amount of time spent on learning 
leads to more knowledge and this can decrease the marginal cost of producing each unit of output. 
5 In this model, firms with relatively high marginal costs are able to sell positive levels of output in a market 
with some firms having relatively low marginal costs.  This is valid if    is not too large.  
6 This sampling cost approach is unnecessary to derive the results.  What is needed is firm heterogeneity with 
respect to cost.  For a sufficiently high value of sampling cost and a sufficiently narrow spread of potential 
values for marginal cost, it would pay a firm to forgo sampling and base its production decision on the 
expected value of marginal cost.  I thank Gilbert Skillman for this insight. 
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cost f  and will exit.  A firm takes the wage rate as given and chooses its level of output 
to maximize profit.7  Let q  denote a firm’s level of output.  A firm’s profit is qfpq  .  
Optimal choice of output leads to 
(2)    





q
p
p
qp 1 .              
For each product, let Q  denote the aggregate output produced by all firms.  The 
total supply of a product is Q  and the total demand for a product is cL .  Goods market 
equilibrium requires that supply equals demand: 
(3)    cLQ  .               
In a symmetric equilibrium, prices of all goods are the same and a consumer purchases the 
same amount of all goods.  This leads to 1pc .  Combining this with equation (3) yields 
(4)    LpQ  .8               
In a Cournot equilibrium, a firm views other firms’ output as given when it chooses 
its level of output.  From a firm’s point of view, the partial derivative of p  with respect to 
q  is equal to the partial derivative of p  with respect to Q .  With this point in mind, 
differentiation of both sides of equation (3) leads to 
p
cL
p
q



 .  Combination of this result 
with equation (2) yields a firm’s elasticity of demand: 
(5)    
Q
q
p
q
q
p



 .               
Plugging equation (5) into equation (2) leads to a firm’s level of output: 
(6)    
p
Qpq  )(  .               
Equation (6) expresses a firm’s output as a function of its marginal cost, a consumer’s 
elasticity of demand, the price level, and aggregate output.  When firms are homogeneous, 
it degenerates to the well-established result that a firm’s price as a markup over marginal 
                                                 
7 As there is a continuum of products and each product is produced by multiple firms, a change of one firm’s 
demand for labor does not affect the wage rate.  However, a firm does have market power in the output 
market since each product is produced by a small number of firms.  
8 Equation (4) can be derived in a different way.  The total value of output is pQ .  Since a firm’s expected 
profit before learning its marginal cost is zero, total expected profit is zero.  Thus, total factor payment is L .  
Equalization of the value of output and total factor payment leads to equation (4). 
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cost under Cournot competition decreases with the number of competing firms.9  Equation 
(6) is consistent with our intuition that a firm’s market share decreases with its marginal 
cost.  
Third, we study the determination of the cutoff level of marginal cost of production 
* .  A firm with marginal cost *  earns a profit of zero and a firm drawing a marginal 
cost higher than *  will exit and never produce.  From equation (6), a firm with a marginal 
cost of   has a profit of f
p
Qp  
2)( .  Thus the cutoff level of marginal cost *  is 
defined by 
(7)    0*)(
2
 f
p
Qp  .             
Finally, with free entry, a firm’s expected profit before learning its marginal cost 
should be equal to zero.  Since the fixed sampling cost is ef , zero profit requires that 
(8)   0)()(*)(
2*



  efdgfp
QpG 


.            
 As all the goods are symmetric, equation (1) leads to 
(9)     
p
c 1 .                
By plugging the value of Q  from equation (4) and the value of c  from equation (9) 
into equations (7) and (8), we get 
(10a)   0*)( 2
2
1 
 f
p
LpA  ,          
(10b)   0)()(*)( 2
2*
2 



  efdgfp
LpGA 


.       
From its definition,   is a function of c .  From equation (9), c  is a function of p .  Thus, 
  is a function of p .  Equations (10a) and (10b) form a system of two equations defining 
                                                 
9 When there are N  homogeneous firms, qNQ  .  Equation (6) changes to 


1

N
Np , which is the 
profit maximizing markup for Cournot oligopoly. 
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two variables p  and *  as functions of exogenous parameters.  An equilibrium in a 
closed economy is a vector ( p , * ) satisfying equations (10a) and (10b).10  
  
3. Analysis of the equilibrium in a closed economy 
In this section, we establish the existence of a unique equilibrium in a closed 
economy.  Then we conduct some comparative static studies to explore properties of this 
equilibrium. 
The following assumption is made: 
 
Assumption 1: 0/)( 2
2



  p
p
p  . 
 
The interpretation of Assumption 1 is as follows.  Since p  is a firm’s per unit 
profit and 2
)(
p
Lp   is a firm’s optimal quantity of production, 2
2)(
p
Lp   is a firm’s 
profit excluding fixed costs.  Assumption 1 requires that a firm’s maximized profit 
excluding fixed costs increases with the price level.  One sufficient condition for 
Assumption 1 to be satisfied is that 0
cd
d  .  Thus it is valid for the constant elasticity 
utility function ( 0
cd
d  ) frequently used in the international trade literature.  If 0
cd
d  , 
it is still possible that 01 


p
A  if 
cd
d   is not too positive.   
The following example will be useful in clarifying this assumption.  For simplicity, 
suppose there is only one firm.  Let the relationship between price and quantity be 
)( pqq  .  For a firm it tries to maximize profit pq .  The first order condition with respect 
to p  is 0


p
qpq .  From this first order condition, we get p
p
qq

 .  Plugging this 
                                                 
10 As the average units of labor required to produce a unit of output is p , the total demand for labor is pQ .  
The total supply of labor is L .  Equalization of labor supply and demand leads to equation (4).  Thus the 
labor market is also in equilibrium when equations (10a) and (10b) are satisfied.  
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value of q  into pq , the profit for a firm’s profit reduces to pqp  /2 .  Then Assumption 
1 requires that the derivative of pqp  /2  with respect to p  is positive.  By specifying 
the utility function appropriately, the inverse demand function can become bqap  , 
where a  and b  are positive constants, then bpq /1/  .  In this case, Assumption 1 
requires that the derivative of bp /2  with respect to p  is positive. 
The following proposition establishes the existence of a unique equilibrium in a 
closed economy. 
 
 Proposition 1: Assumption 1 is a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique 
equilibrium in a closed economy.  
 Proof: From equation (10a), 0
*
1 



A .  With Assumption 1, 01 


p
A .  Thus 1A  
represents a positive relationship between p  and * . From equation (10b), 0
*
2 



A .  
With Assumption 1, 02 


p
A .  Thus 2A  represents a negative relationship between p  and 
* .  For   , the value of p  in 1A  is finite.  In 2A , as   goes to  , p  can be higher 
than any finite number.  Thus the value of p  in 1A  is lower than the value of p  in 2A .  
For   , the value of p  in 1A  is higher than the value of p  in 2A .  It follows that there 
exists a unique set of p  and *  satisfying equations (10a) and (10b).     QED 
 
The intuition behind the proof of Proposition 1 can be visualized from Figure 1.  
The horizontal axis represents the price level and the vertical axis represents the cutoff 
level of marginal cost.  Equation (10a) is shown as the curve labeled as the cutoff MC 
condition and equation (10b) is shown as the curve labeled as the free entry condition.  The 
two curves intersect and intersect only once. 
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Figure 1: Determination of the equilibrium 
  
Total differentiation of equations (10a) and (10b) with respect to p , * , and L  
leads to 




















*
*
22
11


A
p
A
A
p
A




*d
dp
dL
L
A
L
A

















2
1
. 
The determinant of the coefficient matrix is given by 
p
AAA
p
A







 2121
** 
.  
Assumption 1 is sufficient for 0 .11   
With monopolistic competition, a firm’s price is independent of the size of labor 
endowment.  The following proposition shows that under Cournot competition, the price 
decreases and per capita consumption increases with an increase of labor endowment.  
 
Proposition 2: Assumption 1 is sufficient for the equilibrium price to decrease with 
the endowment of labor and per capita consumption to increase with the endowment of 
labor. 
                                                 
11 For utility functions with constant elasticity of demand, for example,   is always positive.  
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 Proof: Define 
**
2121
 






 A
L
A
L
AA
p .  Since 01 

L
A , and 02 


L
A , it follows 
that 0 p .  An application of Cramer’s rule leads to 0

 p
dL
dp .    
From equation (9), a decrease of the price level is associated with an increase of 
per capita consumption.                    QED 
 
 From Proposition 2, an increase of labor endowment decreases the price level.  
From equation (6), a firm’s market share increases with the price level.  Thus an increase 
of labor endowment leads to a decrease of market share of all existing firms.  This is 
achieved through an increase in the number of firms producing the same product.  Thus an 
increase of labor endowment increases the degree of competition.  An increase of the 
number of firms may be achieved through either of two channels.  One channel is an 
increase in the cutoff level of marginal cost.  The other one is through an increase in the 
number of firms sampling to learn their marginal costs. 
Following the proof of Proposition 2, the impact of an increase of labor endowment 
on the cutoff level of marginal cost is ambiguous.  An increase of labor endowment leads 
to two effects working in opposite directions.  First, it increases the size of the market.  
This benefits every firm and is likely to increase the cutoff level of marginal cost.  Second, 
it decreases the price level.  Other things given, this decreases a firm’s profit and is likely 
to decrease the cutoff level of marginal cost.  Without adding new structure to this model, 
it is not clear which effect dominates.   
What is the impact of an increase of labor endowment on average profit of all firms 
producing positive levels of output?  From equation (10b), average profit is *)(/ Gf e .  
Since it is not clear whether *  increases or not, the impact of an increase of labor 
endowment on average profit is ambiguous.  The reason is that an increase of labor 
endowment L  increases the size of the market and the degree of competition at the same 
time.  If the cutoff level of marginal cost *  decreases, average profit increases.  
Otherwise, average profit decreases. 
A higher elasticity of demand means a consumer is more responsive to a price 
change.  In this sense, a market with a higher elasticity of demand is more competitive.  
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For the special case that the elasticity of demand is constant, similar to the proof of 
Proposition 2, an application of Cramer’s rule yields that an increase of elasticity decreases 
the price level.  This result is consistent with our intuition that a market with a higher 
elasticity of demand is associated with a lower price.  The impact of an increase of this 
elasticity on the cutoff level of marginal cost is ambiguous.  
 
4. The equilibrium in an open economy 
In this section, we establish the existence of a unique equilibrium in an open 
economy.  The number of foreign countries is n .  All foreign countries are assumed to 
have the same production technologies and labor endowments as the home country.  Thus 
in equilibrium the wage rate in all countries will be the same.  Transportation cost between 
different countries is of the “iceberg” type: if   units of a product is sent, only one unit is 
received, where 1 .12  Variables related with international trade are denoted with a 
subscript T .  For example, for each product, TQ  denotes the sum of output sold in the 
domestic market produced by all domestic and foreign firms. 
For domestic firms, the cutoff level of marginal cost to earn a non-negative profit 
in the domestic market is defined by 
(11)    0*)(
2
 f
p
Qp
T
TTT  ,           
where   is a function of Tp . 
 Let xf  denote a domestic firm’s fixed cost of selling in each of the foreign 
markets.13  With a fixed cost, some domestic firms may not export.14  As all countries are 
symmetric, a firm either exports to all foreign countries or does not export to any of them.  
                                                 
12 When there is no transportation cost and no fixed cost of entering foreign markets, the opening of trade 
has an impact similar to an increase in domestic population.  As demonstrated in Section 3, this does not 
necessarily leads to the exit of less efficient firms. 
13 Fixed costs in exporting may include costs to set up distribution facilities in foreign countries, costs to 
learn foreign countries’ regulations, and other costs not related to export volume.  In their empirical study, 
Roberts and Tybout [1997] find that the existence of fixed costs is a significant factor affecting a firm’s 
decision to export. 
14 Early on, fixed costs are used in Harris [1995] to separate firms producing for domestic markets only and 
firms engaging in international trade. 
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Let *x  denote the cutoff level of marginal cost for a domestic firm to export.  This cutoff 
level of marginal cost *x  is defined by 
(12)    0)*(
2
 x
T
TxT f
p
Qp  .           
From equations (11) and (12), xx  *  if and only if  
(13)    






 L
f
L
f x 11 .           
One sufficient condition for inequality (13) to be valid is that the fixed cost of international 
trade is higher than the fixed cost of operating in the home country.   
 For a firm selling in both domestic and foreign markets, this firm’s sales revenue 
in the home country is higher than its sales revenue from any foreign country.  This can be 
demonstrated as follows.  From equation (6), a firm’s output in a market is inversely related 
to its marginal cost.  A firm’s marginal cost at home is  , while its marginal cost in a 
foreign country incorporating transportation costs is  .  Thus, a firm’s quantity of sales 
in the domestic market is higher than that in any of the foreign markets.  As prices in all 
countries are the same, this firm’s domestic revenue is higher than its revenue from any 
foreign market. 
As countries are symmetric, the sum of all foreign firms’ revenue in the home 
country is equal to the sum of all domestic firms’ revenue in all foreign countries.  Thus 
the total revenue of all domestic firms with trade is TT Qp .  As the wage rate is normalized 
to one, total domestic factor income is L .  Equalization of the total revenue of all domestic 
firms and total domestic factor income leads to 
(14)    LQp TT  .             
 For domestic firms with marginal costs between   and *T , they earn profit 
f
p
Qp
T
TT  
2)(  from the domestic market.  For domestic firms with marginal costs 
between   and *x , they also earn profit x
T
TT f
p
Qp  
2)(  from each of the n  
foreign markets.  The zero expected profit condition with international trade is given by 
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(15)  


dgf
p
QpG
T
TT
T
T )()(*)(
2*




  
0)()(*)(
2*




  ex
T
TT
T fdgfp
QpnG x 


.        
 Equations (11) and (14) lead to 
(16a)   0*)( 2
2
1 
 f
p
LpT
T
TT  .          
Equation (12) yields the following equation defining *x  as a function of Tp , 
(17)    TxTx pL
f
p 





 11)(* .           
 Plugging the value of *x  defined in equation (17) into equation (15) leads to 
(16b)  


dgf
p
LpGT
T
T
T
T )()(*)( 2
2*
2 



   
0)()(*)( 2
2)*(




  ex
T
Tp
T fdgfp
LpGn Tx 


.      
 Equations (16a) and (16b) form a system of two equations defining Tp  and *T  
as functions of exogenous parameters.  An equilibrium with international trade is a vector 
( Tp , *T ) satisfying equations (16a) and (16b).  The following proposition addresses the 
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in an open economy. 
 
Proposition 3: Assumption 1 is a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique 
equilibrium in an open economy.  
Proof: From equation (16a), 0
*
1 


T
T

.  Assumption 1 is sufficient for 01 


Tp
T .  
From equation (16b), 0
*
2 


T
T

.  Assumption 1 is sufficient for 02 


Tp
T .  While 1T  
represents a positive relationship between Tp  and *T , 2T  represents a negative 
relationship between Tp  and *T .  For   , the value of Tp  in 1T  is lower than the 
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value of Tp  in 2T  as the value of Tp  in 2T  needs to go to infinity.  For   , the value 
of Tp  in 1T  is higher than the value of Tp  in 2T .  It follows that there exists a unique set 
of Tp  and *T  satisfying equations (16a) and (16b).       QED 
 
5. The impact of the opening of international trade 
 In this section, we study the impact of the opening of international trade. 
Total differentiation of equations (16a) and (16b) leads to 
(18)  




















*
*
22
11
TT
TT
T
p
T
T
p
T






*T
T
d
dp
 x
x
df
f
TdTdn
n
T































 222
000


.        
The determinant of the coefficient matrix is given by 
TTTT
T p
TTT
p
T







 2121
** 
.  
Assumption 1 is sufficient for T  to be positive. 
Historically, as illustrated in Pomeranz [2000], industrialization in the Britain was 
associated with the expansion of trade with the New World.  In modern times, an important 
motivation for the expansion of the European Union is to create a larger market size.  Other 
things equal, the size of the market increases with the number of countries engaging in 
international trade.  The following proposition studies implications of a change in the 
number of foreign countries. 
 
Proposition 4: (a) Assumption 1 is sufficient for a representative consumer’s 
welfare to increase with the number of foreign countries.  Specifically, the opening of trade 
increases a consumer’s welfare.  (b) Assumption 1 is sufficient for the cutoff level of 
marginal cost to decrease with the number of foreign countries.  Specifically, the opening 
of trade leads to the exit of less efficient firms. 
Proof: (a) From equation (16b), it can be shown that 02 


n
T .  By setting 
0 xfdd  in the system (18), an application of Cramer’s rule leads to  
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   021 



 T
x
T
n
TT
nd
pd

.  
As the price decreases with the number of foreign countries and the wage rate is normalized 
to one, a consumer’s welfare increases with the number of foreign countries. 
To prove the opening of trade increases a consumer’s welfare, it is sufficient to 
show that the impact of the opening of trade is a change of n  from zero to a positive 
number.   
(b) An application of Cramer’s rule leads to  
    0* 21 



 T
T
T
n
T
p
T
nd
d  .15   
To prove the opening of trade leads to the exit of less efficient firms, it is sufficient 
to show that the impact of the opening of trade is a change of n  from zero to a positive 
number.            QED 
 
While both monopolistic competition and oligopolistic competition models lead to 
the result that the opening of trade leads to the exit of less efficient firms, the mechanisms 
in the two cases are different.  Under monopolistic competition, as a consumer’s elasticity 
of demand is larger than one, a firm charging a lower price has a higher level of revenue.  
A firm with a lower marginal cost of production charges a lower price and thus has a level 
of revenue higher than a firm with a higher marginal cost.  As the opening of trade increases 
the number of varieties produced by firms with lower marginal costs, firms with higher 
marginal costs could not generate enough revenue to cover their fixed costs and they exit.  
Under oligopolistic competition, the number of varieties does not change with trade.  
Regardless of a consumer’s elasticity of demand, a firm with a lower marginal cost sells 
more than a firm with a higher marginal cost.  As the opening of trade decreases the price 
level, this leads to the exit of less efficient firms. 
                                                 
15 The following is an alternative proof that the opening of trade leads to the exit of less efficient firms.  By 
comparing equations (10b) and (16b), it can be shown that the zero expected profit condition moves down 
with the opening of trade.  As the equation defining the cutoff level of marginal cost does not change, the 
equilibrium with international trade has a lower level of cutoff marginal cost.  That is, some less efficient 
firms exit. 
 16
The following proposition shows that while average profit increases with the 
opening of trade, some firms lose from it.   
 
 Proposition 5: (a) The opening of trade leads to an increase of average profit. (b) 
Less efficient firms lose from trade and more efficient firms gain from trade.  
 Proof: (a) From equation (10b), average profit without trade is *)(/ Gf e .  From 
equation (16b), average profit with international trade is *)(/ Te Gf  .  Since **  T , 
average profit increases.   
(b) A firm’s profit is 
f
p
Lp  2
2)()(  . 
Differentiation of this equation with respect to the price level shows that a firm’s profit 
decreases with the price level.  As the opening of trade leads to a decrease of the price level, 
profits of these surviving firms who do not export decrease.  It can be shown that a firm’s 
profit decreases with its marginal cost.  As firms on average earn a higher level of profit, 
profits of more efficient firms must increase with the opening of international trade.   
              QED 
In the literature, the opening of international trade increases a firm’s scale of 
production when firms are homogeneous, as shown in Lahiri and Ono [1995].  This output 
expansion decreases average cost of production and leads to the gains from trade.  In this 
model, with firm heterogeneity, the impact of the opening of trade on average firm size is 
ambiguous. 
Government policies can change the level of entry costs of foreign firms.  Changes 
of transportation technologies can decrease the level of transportation costs.  Historical 
changes of tariffs and transportation costs are documented in Williamson [2006].  The 
following proposition studies some implications of changes in transportation costs and 
entry cost. 
 
Proposition 6: Given Assumption 1, a decrease in transportation costs or entry cost 
reduces the equilibrium levels of price and the cutoff value of marginal cost. 
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Proof: By setting 0 xfdnd  in the system (18), an application of Cramer’s rule 
leads to 0
d
pd T , and 0* 


d
d T .       
By setting 0 dnd  in the system (18), an application of Cramer’s rule leads 
to 0
x
T
fd
pd , and 0* 
x
T
fd
d  .           QED 
 
 Proposition 6 shows that a decrease of entry cost such as caused by a trade 
liberalization or a decrease in transportation costs leads to a lower price and higher 
consumer welfare.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have studied the impact of international trade in a general 
equilibrium model in which heterogeneous firms engage in oligopolistic competition.  
Under oligopolistic competition, a firm’s price as a markup over its marginal cost of 
production decreases with the size of the market.  Even with a general utility function, this 
oligopolistic competition framework is very tractable and comparative static results are 
easily available.  We have established the following results.  First, in a closed economy, an 
increase of the size of the market leads to a decrease of the equilibrium price and an 
increase of per capita consumption.  Second, the opening of trade leads to increased degrees 
of competition and the exit of less efficient firms.  As a result, the price level decreases.  
Finally, though average profit increases, not all the surviving firms benefit from the 
opening of international trade. 
There are some interesting extensions and generalizations of the model.  First, with 
the incorporation of oligopolistic competition, this framework may be useful in studying 
implications of international trade in which firms behave strategically, such as building 
capacities to deter entry.  Second, in this model, countries are symmetric and this leads to 
the result that the opening of international trade leads to the exit of least efficient firms in 
each country.  If all the firms in the partner country are less efficient than all the firms in 
the home country and the goods market is integrated, then all the firms in the partner 
country have to exit first before any firm in the home country exits.  In this case, the impact 
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of the opening of international trade on a country with less efficient firms will be 
complicated.  Finally, the model can be generalized to a dynamic way by incorporating a 
firm’s development of new technologies. 
  
 19
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